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Despite the availability of huge livestock resources, 
pastoralist areas of northern Kenya are characterized 
by chronic vulnerability to drought-related shocks1 and 
pastoralists’ declining coping abilities. Previously successful 
coping strategies include: mobility; keeping large and 
heterogeneous herds; herd splitting during crisis; seeking 
support from kin and clan networks; and knowledge 
of traditional early-warning systems to help minimize 
losses2. Given pastoralists’ declining mobility and difficulty 
repopulating herds, increasing numbers of ex-pastoralists 
are moving to towns to work as petty traders or unskilled 
labourers3. Though pastoralist vulnerability varies, 
depending on gender, poverty, social status, species of 
livestock kept, and degree of mobility, women and girls are 
at greater risk due to limited assets and decision-making 
power.
Innovative strategies are needed to safeguard livestock-based 
livelihoods and enhance drought-coping mechanisms. One 
such strategy is to link the acquisition of a livestock-based 
1. Government of Kenya. 2012. Kenya post disaster needs assessment, drought 
2008–2011. Nairobi, Kenya: Government of Kenya.
2. Lybbert, T.J., Barrett, C.B. Desta, S. and Coppock, D.L. 2004. Stochastic Wealth Dynamics 
and Risk Management among a Poor Population. The Economic Journal 114:750–777.
3. Little, P.D., McPeak, J., Barrett, C.B., and Kristjanson, P. 2008. Challenging 
orthodoxies: understanding poverty in pastoral areas of East Africa. Development 
and Change, 39(4), 587-611.
insurance product with access to informal financial services, 
smoothing out household consumption and preventing 
distressed sales of livestock. To date, financial services 
in Marsabit county, northern Kenya—the focus of this 
study—are quite limited but growing. A handful of formal 
banking institutions can be found in Marsabit town, while 
informal savings groups predominate in more remote 
areas. Poor transportation, communication and electricity 
infrastructure constrain the geographical reach of financial 
institutions and the potential of mobile banking.
In collaboration with CARE Kenya in 2013, the 
Index-based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) project of the 
International Livestock Research Institute undertook 
a study of efforts to integrate livestock insurance with 
group savings and loan organizations (GSLs) in Marsabit 
county. Under their Marsabit Drought Resilience Project 
(MDREP), 71 GSLs were formed across the divisions of 
Maikona, Loiyangalani and North Horr. Constituted by 
community members—primarily women—GSLs pool 
their savings to extend small loans to group members. 
The CARE GSL model relies on community-based 
trainers (CBTs) mobilizing members to form groups, 
which receive training and establish operating and 
lending procedures. The main objective of this IBLI/CARE 
collaboration was to assess the impact of integrating an 
insurance product for pastoralists’ most productive asset 
alongside access to informal financial services.
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Methodology 
Between August 2012 and May 2013, 1685 GSL members 
received training on IBLI, and savings and loans. Forty-
seven groups had exclusively women members, while 22 
were mixed gender and 2 were men only. To assess the 
preliminary outcomes of these efforts, this study asked the 
following research questions: (1) How do GSLs operate 
in terms of loans extended, savings collected, and interest 
charged? (2) Are GSLs an effective extension vehicle for 
IBLI? (3) What is the extent of IBLI uptake through the 
groups? (4) Does provision of credit from GSLs relax 
members’ liquidity constraints and in turn facilitate IBLI 
uptake? And (5) Could GSLs increase the accessibility of 
IBLI by acting as sales agents, and what benefits/risks could 
sales agency have for the groups and on insurance sales?
The methodology comprised a two-pronged data gathering 
effort, including focus group discussions (FGDs) and 
member questionnaires. Fourteen FGDs were conducted 
to assess the extent of IBLI purchase, and members’ 
understanding of IBLI and their opinions and suggestions 
about delivery channels and sales agency. The number 
of groups selected per division was proportional to 
the number of GSLs in that division. Four FGDs were 
conducted in Gas (North Horr division), Four in North 
Horr (North Horr division), three in Kargi (Loiyangalani 
division), two in Elgade (Maikona division), and one in 
Bubisa (Maikona division).
In addition, the team conducted 138 individual 
questionnaires with focus group participants (113 
female and 25 male respondents) to probe individual 
understanding and decision-making, as well as 12 semi-
structured interviews with participants to understand 
motivations for group membership and solicit participants’ 
decision processes concerning insurance purchase 
and pay-out use. Key informant interviews were also 
conducted with the five CBTs. Analysis of these data 
sources was supplemented with data from the IBLI 
Marsabit 924-household survey, part of a multi-year impact 
evaluation strategy designed to record extensive livelihood 
and welfare indicators and precisely estimate the impact of 
IBLI. The IBLI household survey data included 114 CARE 
GSL households and 810 non-GSL households.
Findings 
GSL operations and borrowing patterns
According to CARE reporting data collected in March 
2013, the 71 MDREP groups had mobilized savings 
worth nearly KES2 million4 and had made active loans 
worth KES1.1 million. Although the active loan-to-savings 
ratio was 57%, individual GSL constitutions and lending 
conditions, loan size and accessibility varied. Among most 
of the 14 GSLs in which FGDs were conducted, maximum 
loan limits depended on the borrower’s ability to repay 
and available cash on hand in the loan fund. All groups 
surveyed reported that borrowers were charged an 
interest rate of 10%; however, due to significant variability 
in loan repayment periods, between one and six months, 
effective monthly interests rates ranged between 10 and 
4. KES 1= USD 0.011 in March 2013
1.67%, with half of the groups collecting 3.33% per month 
for three months. Collateral and liability requirements also 
varied; some required collateral, while others mandated 
guarantorship by a family member. In case of late payment, 
most groups levied additional interest (typically +10%), 
while some imposed fines or allowed for repayment 
extensions.
According to the 2012 IBLI household survey, GSL 
households were more likely to borrow (16%) than non-
GSL households (5%). Fewer than half of the 138 FGD 
participants responding to the questionnaire had ever 
taken a loan from the GSL, the median value of which was 
KES6000. The top three reasons given for taking loans by 
group members were: paying school fees, investment for 
petty and livestock trade, and purchasing food. No member 
reported having taken a loan expressly to purchase 
livestock insurance, and only 3% used credit to restock 
their herd5.
IBLI extension 
The study found broad enthusiasm among focus group 
participants for the use of the GSLs as IBLI extension 
vehicles. Furthermore, group members demonstrated 
better comprehension of the IBLI product than non-GSL 
households in IBLI’s household survey. Their responses to 
questions testing insurance understanding were on average 
17% more accurate than non-GSL households’ responses 
(60 versus 43%). This indicates the relative success of 
GSLs in raising the levels of insurance awareness among 
pastoralists. Nevertheless, we noted great unevenness 
between and within groups with respect to members’ 
understanding of IBLI and the general principles of savings 
and loans. This may be due to the frequency and quality of 
CBT training, as well as groups’ pre-existing mistrust of 
financial transactions. Trainers’ activities were hampered by 
long distances between groups and the high transportation 
costs, not covered by their contract with CARE.
IBLI uptake 
Uptake was quite low among both the CARE GSL 
households and the 924 IBLI survey households (6–9%). 
There was also a distinct geographic pattern of uptake 
among GSL households, with the large majority of IBLI 
purchasers (71%) coming from a single division (Gas). 
In this location, trainers were more active and the level 
of understanding about IBLI higher compared to other 
divisions surveyed. Table 1 presents the breakdown of 
animals insured by GSL members and sub-location.
Table 1: No. of animals insured by GSL members: Aug-Sept 
2012 and Jan–Feb 2013 sale periods
Sub-location Camels Cattle Shoats
Gas 62 15 610
Kargi 0 2 76
North Horr 0 0 69
Bubisa 0 0 0
Total 62 17 755
5. This corroborates findings from a parallel IBLI study by Gesare, A., Sheahan, M., 
Mude, A., and Banarjee, R. 2015. Determinants of Pastoral Women’s Demand for 
Credit; Evidence from Marsabit in northern Kenya, Working Paper. Nairobi: Kenya: 
International Livestock Research Institute.
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Shoats were by far the most common animals insured 
across all the sub-locations, while camels were only insured 
in Gas. Notably, only shoats were insured in North Horr, 
while limited CBT activity and IBLI understanding in Bubisa 
generated no new uptake. The preference to insure shoats 
appears to stem from lower premium costs. In individual 
interviews, purchasers often explained their preference 
for insuring shoats as a result of liquidity constraints. As 
10 shoats can be insured for the price of one cow (or one 
tropical livestock unit), only small amounts of cash are 
required to pay premiums for a handful of animals.
 
A Rendille pastoralist in Kargi presents her insurance receipt.  
(Photo: L. Johnson)
Although most group members were women, on average 
men insured a larger number of animals and hence paid 
more premiums. Roughly 80% of camels and cattle insured 
were insured by men, while approximately half of shoats 
were insured by each gender. The average premiums paid by 
men and women were KES2201 and KES708, respectively. 
Many GSL members reported they had adopted a ‘wait and 
see’ attitude with respect to purchasing insurance. Other 
reasons given for not purchasing livestock insurance are 
presented in Table 2. Among factors discouraging purchase, 
interestingly liquidity constraints did not rank considerably 
higher than product understanding.
Table 2: Primary reason for not purchasing livestock  
insurance
Reason
% of  
responses
Wait and see what happens to those who bought 
insurance
25
Don’t have money to spend on insurance 22
Did not understand insurance well enough to buy it 20
Don’t think insurance will help me 19
Don’t have enough animals 10
Already purchased in Aug-Sept 2012 sales period 4
 
Relation between credit and IBLI uptake 
According to questionnaire responses, the main sources of 
money for purchasing insurance by group members were: 
own savings (76%), a portion of a GSL loan (13%), loans 
from others (8%), and borrowing from friends (3%). Notably, 
FGD participants resolutely disinclined to take GSL loans 
to purchase insurance, although some reported paying IBLI 
premiums with a small proportion of past loans. Analysis of 
questionnaire data shows no significant relationship between 
GSL borrowing and IBLI purchase. Though not significant at 
any level, a Pearson pairwise correlation analysis reveals both 
slight negative and positive influences of borrowing on the 
purchase of IBLI, depending on the season.
Focus group participants almost universally considered the 
combination of GSL borrowing to purchase insurance to 
be a particularly risky form of double jeopardy, as loans and 
interest would still have to be repaid regardless of whether 
they received insurance compensation. Several groups 
referred to this as a ‘double loss’. There was also the keenly 
sensed presence of basis risk, which could lead to a ‘triple 
loss’ situation in which a member lost a significant number 
of livestock without receiving a pay-out. The mismatch 
between loan repayment timeframes and the IBLI pay-out 
calendar also discouraged borrowing for this purpose, since 
the 6-12 month window for potential pay-outs is long in 
comparison to the three-month loan repayment period of 
most groups. This perception of double jeopardy would be 
a major stumbling block to efforts to increase IBLI demand 
through access to credit.
The potential for GSLs to act as IBLI agents 
Given stark inter-group disparities in literacy, numeracy 
and IBLI understanding and interest, it was difficult to 
generalize about the possibilities, benefits and risks 
of GSLs acting as IBLI agents. Some groups expressed 
interest in this possibility, while others dismissed 
agency as too complex and risky. Some group members 
expressed fears of agency damaging their credibility and 
reputation among community members in the event 
that losses suffered did not trigger pay-outs to the 
insured parties. Although extending agency to the groups 
would likely have a near-term positive impact on IBLI 
accessibility in underserved areas, it might not generate 
net income for the groups for quite some time.
Conclusions and recommendations 
The study found substantive differences between the 
14 GSLs profiled, including interest rates, collateral 
requirements, and savings-to-loan ratios. Nevertheless, 
overall GSL members accumulated more savings and 
accessed more loans than their non-GSL counterparts. 
GSL members’ relative success in correctly answering 
questions on IBLI suggests extension through GSL groups 
may be more effective than through normal IBLI channels. 
But full product comprehension is patchy and depends 
on CBT quality and motivation. Increasing understanding 
of IBLI hinges on improving training of GSL members and 
developing a package of more accessible educational tools 
for use in the groups.
Moreover, little evidence was found to suggest that 
extension through GSLs had increased IBLI uptake above 
the 6-9% household baseline rate. Most households are 
reluctant to borrow to purchase insurance, due to high 
interest rates on loans, the social and economic sanctions 
on default, and the risk of the insurance not triggering. 
Therefore, one way of increasing IBLI uptake would be to 
further subsidize insurance premiums or loans.
ILRI Research Brief—December 20154
The research brief has a Creative Commons licence. You are free to re-use or distribute this work, provided credit is given to ILRI.            December 2015
ilri.org 
better lives through livestock 
ILRI is a member of the CGIAR Consortium
Box 30709, Nairobi 00100, Kenya 
Phone: +254 20 422 3000 
Fax:     +254 20 422 3001 
Email: ILRI-Kenya@cgiar.org
Box 5689, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Phone: +251 11 617 2000  
Fax: +251 11 617 2001 
Email: ILRI-Ethiopia@cgiar.org
Photo credit:   
Page 1: ILRI/Riccardo Gangale 
Page 1: ILRI/Riccardo Gangale
Samuel Mburu and Andrew Mude work for the 
International Livestock Research Institute, and Leigh 
Johnson works in the Department of Geography at the 
University of Zurich.
Contact
Andrew Mude 
ILRI, Kenya 
a.mude@cgiar.org 
http://ibli.ilri.org/
Although group IBLI agency may be feasible in 
some locations, careful planning and management of 
expectations will be required so as to avoid damaging 
the groups’ or IBLI’s reputations or creating competition 
between agents. Extending the agency model to GSLs 
requires specific understandings of individual groups’ 
capacities and intra-group dynamics of trust, decision-
making, and profit-sharing.
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